Best Adverse Employment Action Attorney Answer:
Most of time when someone is contacting us regarding their potential legal claims against an employer, they are doing so because they were wrongfully terminated. But what if you were not terminated, but instead were transferred to a less prestigious position with a worse schedule and fewer job perks due to discrimination? Well, it’s a good thing adverse employment actions cover more than just terminations.
An “adverse employment action” under Title VII is an action by an employer that constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
The United States Supreme Court recently issued a ruling in Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow’s gender discrimination case against the City of St. Louis, which hinged on the question of whether a job transfer, not a termination, constituted gender discrimination.
Sergeant Muldrow filed a lawsuit against the City of St. Louis under Title VII, alleging that her transfer from the Intelligence Division to a uniformed role within the St. Louis Police Department was motivated by gender discrimination. Despite maintaining her rank and pay, Muldrow argued that the transfer significantly altered her employment conditions, resulting in damages.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 967, 974 (2024).
During her tenure in the Intelligence Division, Muldrow conducted high-profile investigations into public corruption and human trafficking, oversaw specialized units, and collaborated closely with senior officials. However, the new commander of the division, Captain Michael Deeba, a male, sought to replace Muldrow with a male officer, citing the perceived suitability of the male officer for the division’s “very dangerous” work. Work that Muldrow was previously doing without issue.
Despite Muldrow’s objections, the Department approved her transfer, relocating her to the Fifth District where she supervised patrol officers and handled administrative duties. This new role lacked the prestige and responsibilities of her previous position, and Muldrow’s work schedule became irregular, often involving weekend shifts. Further, she lost benefits such as her FBI status and take-home vehicle.
Muldrow contended that these changes amounted to gender discrimination under Title VII, asserting that they adversely affected the terms and conditions of her employment. However, the lower courts dismissed her claim, applying a standard requiring Muldrow to demonstrate “significant” harm, which they concluded she had not met.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts’ interpretation, ruling that Title VII does not impose a requirement of “significant” harm. Instead, the statute only necessitates showing some harm in employment conditions due to discrimination. Specifically, the Court noted,
What the transferee does not have to show, according to the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was “significant.” 30 F.4th, at 688. Or serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar. See supra, at ––––, and –––– – ––––, n. 1. “Discriminate against” means treat worse, here based on sex. See, e.g., Bostock, 590 U.S., at 657–658, 681, 140 S.Ct. 1731. But neither that phrase nor any other says anything about how much worse. There is nothing in the provision to distinguish, as the courts below did, between transfers causing significant disadvantages and transfers causing not-so-significant ones. And there is nothing to otherwise establish an elevated threshold of harm. To demand “significance” is to add words—and significant words, as it were—to the statute Congress enacted. It is to impose a new requirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the law as applied demands something more of her than the law as written.
Muldrow, 144 S. Ct. 967, at 974 (emphasis added).
The Court further explained,
Muldrow need show only some injury respecting her employment terms or conditions. The transfer must have left her worse off, but need not have left her significantly so. And Muldrow’s allegations, if properly preserved and supported, meet that test with room to spare. Recall her principal allegations. She was moved from a plainclothes job in a prestigious specialized division giving her substantial responsibility over priority investigations and frequent opportunity to work with police commanders. She was moved to a uniformed job supervising one district’s patrol officers, in which she was less involved in high-visibility matters and primarily performed administrative work. Her schedule became less regular, often requiring her to work weekends; and she lost her take-home car. If those allegations are proved, she was left worse off several times over. It does not matter, as the courts below thought (and Justice THOMAS echoes), that her rank and pay remained the same, or that she still could advance to other jobs. See supra, at –––– – ––––; post, at ––––. Title VII prohibits making a transfer, based on sex, with the consequences Muldrow described.
Muldrow, 144 S. Ct. 967 at 977 (emphasis added).
In summary, Muldrow’s case should not have been dismissed based on the heightened standard applied by the lower courts. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with their opinion, acknowledging that Muldrow’s allegations, if substantiated, meet the standard of demonstrating harm to her employment conditions as required by Title VII.
What do I do if I just experienced an adverse employment action?
Best Employment Lawyer Answer: The best thing to do if you think you may have been treated differently by your employer based on your race, gender, disability, sexual orientation, religion, military status, or age is to call the right attorney to schedule a free and confidential consultation. (Read: What is the Spitz No Fee Guarantee?; Why Having Skilled Employment Attorneys Is Critical). Call our lawyers in Ohio, Michigan, and North Carolina to get help now. Spitz, The Employee’s Law Firm and its experienced attorneys are dedicated to protecting employees’ rights and solving employment disputes.
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